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So much has been said and published on the
subject of narcoanalysis, that it seems appropriate
to review briefly at this time the progress, if any,
made since its formal introduction in the American
courts, some thirty-five years ago, and to summarize on its merits, demerits, uses and abuses.
Narcoanalysis, better known by its popular
name of "truth serum test," consists of a test
during which a subject is given an injection with
a barbiturate drug, usually scopolamine, sodium
amytal, or sodium pentothal. W17hen the drug takes
effect, the subject is questioned and feels a compulsion to answer these questions truthfully, or
so it is claimed. The popular term "truth serum"
is a misnomer, since neither of the barbiturates
are serums, and the test certainly does not invariably lead to the truth.
For many centuries it was recognized that one
way to make a reluctant witness talk and loosen
his tongue was by giving him wine. It was from
that period that the ancient saying goes in vino
veritas, the truth is in the wine! W1hen German
doctors started using scopolamine and solutions
of morphine blended together synergistically in
order to ease delivery pains of young mothers, in
the beginning of this century, it was noted that
one of the after effects of the anesthetics was that
patients made candid and uninhibited remarks
about their personal life or about others which
they normally would not have revealed.'
One of the first papers to be published on the
use of such methods to obtain truthful information
from criminals, was from the hand of a Texas
physician, Dr. Robert Ernest House, called the
"father of the truth serum," and was published
2
in 1922 in the Texas State Journal of Mfedicine.

Dr. House suggested administration of a first
dose of 31 grain of morphine sulphate with ]1oo
grain of scopolamine hydrobromide, followed at
30 minute intervals with lesser doses of scopolamine and periods of light chloroform applications.
Wlen awaking from the chloroform treatment,
subjects freely and openly answered questions
which were put to them. Dr. House reports several
such cases which resulted in convicts being released from custody, and observed that, after
returning from their "twilight sleep," the subjects
did not recall the facts they had revealed during
the tests. After numerous experiments, Dr. House
considered his tests practically infallible when
applied properly.
Before an assembly of law enforcement officers
in Houston, Texas, he declared in September,
1924:
"With apparent success, I have devised a
process by which memory can be extracted
against the will from an individual's subconscious mind, by injecting into the blood a certain
quantity of the drug scopolamine, the so-called
truth serum. This drug produces either profound sleep or wakefulness without reason, and
while in that condition of artificial unconsciousness, the individual will reply to questions
with child-like simplicity and with child-like
honesty, without evasiveness, guile, deceit, or
fraud, not truthfully, but as the answer to a
3
query that is stored in his mind as memory."1
His experiences -tnd many tests lead Dr. House
to believe firmly that there is no human mind
capable of resisting the effect of scopolamine, and
that, if given time and favorable environments for
an analysis, he could prove that scopolamine is

GEIS, "In Scopolamine Veritas," JOUR.
LAW, CnMnxOL. AND POL. Sc., 50 (4), 347-

3Address by Dr. R. E. House, delivered at the International Association for Identification's Tenth
Annual Convention in Houston, Texas, in September,
1924. (Proceedings of the 10th Annual Convention of
the IAI, pp. 49; also reprinted in FINGER PRINT AND

'GILBERT

OF CRaI.

3572 (1959).
RoBErT E. Hot'sE, '"The Use of Scopolamine in
Criminology," (1922), reprinted in AmERICAN JOL'RNAL
OF POLICE SCIENCE, 2 (4), 328-38, Jily-Aug. 1931.

IDENTIFICATION MAGAZINE, 6 (7), 3-7, Jan., 1925.)
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"one of the most reliable discoveries for the detection of crime since the discovery- of the finger
print."
I)r. House lived at a time when more often than
not it was the custom to "beat the truth out of a
witness or suspect." Revolted by such inhuman
treatments, he saw his truth serum as a protection
of human rights. He declared to the police officers
in Houston:
"I offer miy theory only as a humane third
degree. If a suspect tells without coercion the
truth, and his statement is verified, there would
be no use for any type of third degree, but when
a suspect will not tell the truth and what he
tells cannot be Verified, then it should be permissible and a State should permit any humane
measure to prove his guilt or innocence. I may
be wrong, but I believe the rights of society are
paramount to the right of the criminal."
The doctor from Ferris was of course no lawyer,
and could not foresee the legal battles that would
be waged in the future over the acceptance of his
truth serum tests in court.
Another researcher, Dr. Lindemann, experimenting along the same lines, found that a 3 to 4
grain intravenous injection of sodium amytal
produces a psychological release in a patient which
will induce him to speak truthfully and freely,
candidly revealing facts about his behaviour and
experiences.4 Dr. W. F. Lorenz, director of the
Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute, was another of
the early scientists in this field, and published a
paper in 1932 in the Archives of Ncurology and

Psvchiatry on "Criminal Confessions under Narcosis." The mass of informative literature on the
subject, published since then, more enthusiastically in favor of its application in criminal cases
in earlier than present day authors, has resulted
in a gradual but steady "cooling off" in the application of "truth serums" as a first line method
of investigation or prosecution.
The many experiments conducted have evidenced the fact that drugs are not entirely reliable
in detecting deception and that it is possible to
maintain false statements under narcoanalysis.
Voluntary- and involuntary interrogation tests
conducted by qualified psychiatrists have led
to the conclusion that only a person who wilfully
consenftl to admit or deny guilt, will do so under
narcoaialysis. An often quoted report of such
tests. conducted by two faculty members of the
E. I.lNDEMAN., "The Psychopathological Effect
of Sodium Amytal," AiMERICAN JOU-RNAT. OF Ps'cznATRY. 13, 853 (1934).
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Yale Medical School and two of the Yale Law
School states:
"... experimental and clinical findings indicate that only individuals who have conscious
and unconscious reasons for doing so are inclined to confess and yield to interrogation under
drug influence. On the other hand, some are able
to withhold information and some, especially
character neurotics, are able to lie. Others are
so suggestible they will describe, in response to
suggestive questioning, behavior which never in
fact occurred." 5
While a significant reduction of the will to resist is noted when a person is injected with a
barbiturate, it is pointed out that if he has firmly
decided not to give in, or not to reveal anything
he does not wish to be known, he will not do so,
just as it has been established by specialists that
often a person under hypnosis will remain adamant
if he so firmly decides. 6 To quote Professor A. Ley:
"In actual fact, it is certain that a normal
person, who has carefully built for himself a
system of defence and who wants neither to
talk nor admit, will not talk, even under the
influence of narco-analysis. It is impossible to
break into the human mind, and the hope which
some people may have nourished that narcoanalysis would serve as a 'skeleton-key' to pry
into it, must be completely given up." 7
Most writers agree with this statement and refuse to endorse nar.coanalysis as a reliable way to
obtain the truth. One author, who based his
opinion on extensive experience gained as a psychiatrist employed by the State of Colorado, and
as a consulting psychiatrist to the District Courts
of Colorado, emphatically states:8
IDEssIoN,

FREEDMAN, DO-ELLY,

AND

REDLICH,

"Drug Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation," YALE: LAW JOURNAL, 62, 315-319 (1953). Quoted

in J. R. Richardson, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE,
The W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati (1961), p. 311.
6 F. F. LOUWAGE, "Use of Barbiturics in MedicoLegal Expert Examinations," INxRN. CRIH. POL.
REv., 4, 2-7 (1949).
7 DR. A. Lx, "Narco-Analysis," REvIEw OF CmNAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, p. 549, cited in INTERN.
CRIM. POL. REV., 4, 2 (1949). Inbau writes: "Based
upon author's own experience in observing or participating in 'truth-serum' tests, he is of the opinion that
such tests are occasionally effective on persons who
would have previously disclosed the truth anyway if
they had been properly interrogated; while on the
other hand. a person who is capable of resisting an
effective common sense interrogation could probably
resist a 'truth-serum' test with equal succLss. FREr E.
INBAV,

SELF-INCRIMINATION,

Charles

C Thomas,

Publisher, Springfield, 11., p. 69 (1950).
8 JoHN M. MAcDoNxLO, "Truth Serum," JOUR. or
CmRI. LAW, CRIMIXOL. AND POL. Sc., 46 (2), 259-263
(1955).
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"It is well known that a person under the influence of alcohol may'reveal information which
he would not disclose when sober. Barbiturates
are preferable to alcohol because results are
obtained in a shorter time, under more uniform
conditions which are easier to control and which
are more conducive to satisfactory interrogation.
The intravenous injection of a drug by a physician in a hospital may appear more scientific
than the drinking of large amounts of bourbon
in a tavern, but the end results displayed in the
subject's speech may be no more reliable. The
drugged person may be just as boastful and untruthful as the alcoholic."
The first case in the United States in which the
introduction of testimony obtained under narcoanalysis was brought to issue, was in the state of
Missouri, in 1926. The defense attorney in this
prosecution for rape attempted to introduce in
evidence the expert testimony of a doctor who
declared that he had questioned the defendant
while the latter was under the influence of a "truth
telling serum" that the doctor had injected, and
that defendant had denied all guilt to the crime
while under the influence of the "serum." The
court iejected such testimony as completely unreliable, and, from the scientific viewpoint, wholly
unwarranted, since no proper foundation was laid,
and no extensive tests conducted which could lead
to conclusive result in examinations of that nature.
9
The opinion was expressed as follows:
"Testimony of this character-barring the
sufficient fact that it cannot be classified otherwise than a self-serving declaration-is, in the
present state of human knowledge, unworthy
of serious consideration. We are not told from
what well this serum is drawn or in what alembic
its alleged truth compelling powers are distilled.
Its origin is as nebulous as its effect is uncertain. A belief in its potency, if it has any
existence, is confined to the modem Cagliostros
who still, as Balsamo did of old, cozen the
credulous for a quid pro quo, by inducing them
to believe in the magic powers of philters, potions and cures by faith. The trial court, therefore, whether it assigned a reason for its action
or not, ruled correctly in excluding this claptrap from the consideration of the jury."
In another case on record, the court admitted
as evidence opinion testimony from a psychiatrist
based upon the results of a clinical examination
9
SIate r. Hutdson, 314 Mo 599, 602, 289 SW 920,
921 (1926).

which included psychological tests and an iiterview under narcosis with sodium pentothal. In
the case at bar, a fifteen-year old girl who had been
sexually assaulted, testified as a witness for the
prosecution for statutory rape against defendant.
Under cross-examination, the honesty of the witness was seriously challenged and in an effort to
rehabilitate its witness, the prosecution called to
the stand the psychiatrist who told the court that
it was his professional opinion that the girl had
been telling the truth when she repeated the
charges-previously made to the police-under
direct examination. He added that, considering
her personality and way of life as a normal young
girl, she did not lie and that she could not have
known the facts with regard to defendant's sexual
relations with her, without having been in fact
the victim of such experience.
The court admitted the testimony, not as substansive evidence, but as a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness. Over the objection of defendant's counsel, a tape recording of
the doctor's interview with the girl, while she was
under narcosis, was introduced into the court
record and played back to the jury. On appeal,
the judgment was reversed on the ground that
defendant was denied due process of law.
In its opinion, the United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) reversed defendant's conviction,
holding that a tape recording of an interview between a psychiatrist and a witness who is under
narcoanalysis is inadmissible even as a prior consistent statement for the only purpose of rehabilitating an impeached witness.
On appeal, the court adopted the view that a
prior consistent statement is only admissible when
it was made at a time when the witness had no
motive to fabricate. The court furthermore stated
that the interview was had for the express purpose
of showing the truth of the previous allegations
of the witness. For this reason, the court said,
a motive to fabricate might exist, except if the
drug would remove the possibility to fabricate.
Before such a prior consistent statement made
while under the influence of a sodium pentothal
injection could be admitted, it should be scientifically established that the test is absolutely accurate and reliable in all cases. Although the
value of the test in psychiatric examinations was
conceded, the court pointed out that the reliability
of sodium pentothal tests had not been sufficiently
established to warrant admission of its results in
evidence. "Scientific tests," the court said, "re-
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veal that people thus prompted to speak freely
do not always tell the truth."
Furthermore, the court severely criticized the
use of the term "truth serum" in reference to the
sodium pentothal test, since a jury wrongly might
said under influence
be led to believe that anything
10
of the drug must be true.
The only exception to the rule established in
State v. Hudson in 1926 was a California decision

in 1954 where the court overruled the state's objection to the introduction of psychiatric testimony
for the defendant because it was obtained as a result of a sodium pentothal test.' In its decision,
the court conceded that the truth of statements
revealed under narcoanalysis remains uncertain,
and that it therefore is doubtful that such evidence, establishing the truth of asserted facts,
would be admissible. However, the court distinguished sharply between the above occurrence
and the psychiatrist's conclusions as an expert,
based upon the ensemble of the tests and examinations he subjected defendant to.
In another case, the testimony of a psychiatrist
was refused when he wanted to show that questions asked of defendant and answers made by
him while under influence of sodium pentothal
indicating that defendant's testimony given on
the witness stand that he did not kill deceased
was true. On appeal, it was held that the refusal
of the trial court was not error, and the court emphasized :12
"Until the use of the drug as a means of procuring the truth from people under its influence
is accorded general scientific recognition, we
are unwilling to enlarge the already immense
field where medical experts, apparently equally
qualified, express such diametrically opposed
10Lindsey r. United States, 237 F2d. 893 (9 Circuit

1956). See also Knight v. State (Florida), 97 So 2d 115.
The results of truth serum tests are not admissible
for the purpose of rehabilitating a witness.
11People -. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).

The New York courts refuted the California decision
in People v. Ford,304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952).
12State v. Lindenudh, 56 N.M. 237, 243 P. 2d 325
(1952). In Dugan t. Comm., Ky., 333 S.W.2d 755

(1960), defendant was given a truth serum test before
the trial by a psychiatrist employed by him. The court
refused to admit testimony of the psychiatrist to the
effect that the test revealed that when the defendant said
the shooting was an "accident." lie was telling the
truth. Upon appeal, the judgment of the trial court was
affirmed. Again, the argument of the court was that,
as yet, no court of last resort has recognized the admissibility of the results of truth serum tests, the
principal ground having been that such tests have not
attained sufficient recognition of dependability and
reliability.
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views on the same facts and conditions, to the
despair of the court reporter and the bewilderment of the fact finder."
From the few decisions cited, it will be noted
that in each case the use of narcoanalysis was
argued as a defense, rehabilitation, or denial of
guilt. It seems safe to assume that no American
court will accept or hear testimony of confessions
obtained under narcoanalysis.
Since 1926, extensive tests have been made in
many universities, but one of the basic charges of
the court argument in State v. Hudson still stands:
Narcoanalysis does not permit absolute certainty,
"beyond a shadow of a doubt," of the guilt or innocence of the suspect who was subjected to a test.
Even if such certainty were obtained, it seems
obvious that such uncorroborated testimony
would be stricken as inadmissible because of the
rule against involuntary confessions and self incrimination.
The use of a coerced confession in obtaining a
conviction is a violation of due process, and if
such confession is admitted in evidence, that is
sufficient to void the conviction regardless of
other evidence which might nevertheless demonstrate guilt. 3 In People v. Leyra, defendant was
not informed that the physician who examined
him had been called into the case by the district
attorney and that district attorney and police
officers were listening to the conversation between
defendant and physician. The defendant was not
told that he was under no duty to speak or that
anything he might say could be used against him.
His statements were inadmissible and judgments
of conviction reversed and a new trial ordered.
Before a confession can be accepted, it must be
shown that it was obtained without duress, intimidation, threats, coercion, or harsh and cruel
treatment. A confession obtained while under
psychological pressure of threats is considered involuntary and will therefore not stand up in court.
But it is held that threats which do not produce
fear will not preclude consideration of the confession.14
One of the most recent court decisions reversing the judgment of a lower court because the
latter had failed to conform to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in determin12People r. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d '553

(1951).
14State v. Winters, 39 Wash. 2d 545, 236 P2d 1038

(1951).
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ing the admissibility of the confession, reads as
follows: 15
"The rule was clear that convictions following
the admission into evidence which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical
or psychological (emphasis supplied, author),
cannot stand. This is not so because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the
methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial svstem-a system in which the State
must establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured and may not by coercion
prove its charge against an accused out of his
own mouth."
While this particular case did not involve a confession obtained under narcoanalysis, the principle
appears to apply to this subject matter, just as it
has been established in many other instances.
Maybe by now the reader has gathered the
opinion that it is utterly hopeless to consider the
use of narcoanalysis in law enforcement. This is
not so. In the hands of a competent physician,
narcoanalysis can be of valuable assistance in
many instances.
It should be borne in mind that, in the present
state of experience with narcoanalysis, no reliance
should be given to the tests as a means of proving
your case in court and obtaining a conviction
that will not be reversed on appeal. However,
narcoanalysis may aid law enforcement officers
in discovering valuable clues and leads which may
produce tangible and irrefutable evidence that
will stand up in a court of law.
Narcoanalysis can be of help in restoring the
memory of forgetful witnesses who consent to the
test in order to facilitate the recalling of important
details of facts which they witnessed. In pleas
of insanity, it may give a fair idea of whether or not
the contention is true or faked. It may help to
clear innocent people who voluntarily submit to
the test, just as well as it may morally convince
the investigator that a person is guilty, thus encouraging him to concentrate his efforts on that
person in order to secure admissible evidence. It
may restore the memory of amnesia victims who
cannot be otherwise identified.
The early researcher Dr. House, reported . case
where he questioned a convict at San Quentin

who had lost all memory since the day a grenade
exploded near him, in the Argonne battle, during
the first world war. Under the influence of scopolamine, the "walking dead man," as he was
called, was able to recall facts about his earlier
life, including his name, where he was born, to
whom he was married, in what hospitals he had
been, etc. 6
Within the limits previously outlined, narcoanalysis can be of great assistance, because even
if no concrete facts are unearthed during an interview, the psychiatrist often is able to render an
expert opinion to the police about his findings concerning the behavior and mental condition of the
interviewee.
The limitations of the "truth serum" teits should
never be forgotten. During the present state of
development, it is proven that some people are
able to lie while interrogated under narcoanalysis.
It is also important to consider that those who do
tell the truth, will relate only what they think to
be the truth. The danger is eminent in the case of
eyewitnesses, and narcoanalysis offers no advantage over regular interrogation procedures in
such instances, other than maybe facilitating the
memory process. Experience has taught us that
the most honest eyewitness can involuntarily and
innocently make the most damaging errors. This
has been found to be true to such an extent that
it led to the often heard axiom "as unreliable as
an eyewitness."
While it is important to secure the authorization
of the subject to be interrogated under narcosis,
there seems to be an exception to the rule when a
plea of insanity is set up as a defense.
Richardson declares that "itis generally held
that the constitutional immunity from self-incrimination does not apply to a compulsory examination
to determine the defendant's physical or mental
condition for the purpose of testifying thereto,
provided the defendant is not compelled to answer
any questions, with the answers being used testimonially on trial. (Commonwealth v. Musto, 348
Pa 300, 35 A 2d 307 [1907]).'
If and when a psychiatrist uses narcoanalysis
during his examination, it is held he does so not
in order to elicit a confession, nor to determine
whether or not the subject participated to any
extent to a certain crime, but rather to form a
'6 0p. cited, note 3.

Is Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 47 Ax. BAR
AssN. JouR. 618-619 (1961).

EVIDENcE, The W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati (1961),
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general expert opinion as to the mental condition
of the subject at the time a crime was known to
have been committed. If during this interview,
the subject, in answer to certain questions, gave
indications of guilt or innocence, while the psychiatrist could communicate those findings to the
investigating authorities, he should refrain from
mentioning these statements on the witness stand
and confine his testimony to the issue of sanity
or insanity.

18

On this subject, the distinguished professor of
law at the University of Kentucky writes:
...

properly speaking, the psychiatrist, who

has conducted a truth serum interview does not
testify as to what the subject told him while
under the influence of the drug. Rather, the
witness should give an expert opinion based on
his findings and conclusions. So, if the answers
to questions are not offered testimonially it may
be argued that narcoanalysis is closely related
to such procedures as blood tests to determine
parentage, intoxication and lie detector tests,
and even fingerprinting, assuming accuracy and
reliability of course." 9
Closely related to this issue is an interesting
18Conrad reports that in Oklahoma a psychiatrist
for the state was permitted to show examination of
the defendant under narcoanalysis where the doctor's
personal observation was the chief basis of his opinion
(in Brown v.State, 304 P.2d 361). EDWIN C. CONtAD,
IODERN TRIAL EVmENCE, West Publishing Co.,

St. Paul, Minn., (1956).
9Cf. footnote 13, at p. 314.
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Illinois case. A youthful drug addict was given
scopolamine to ease his withdrawal agony as a result of forced deprivation of heroin. Such procedure is customary in the treatment of drug addicts. During the treatment, the youth confessed
to a murder. About fifteen hours later, he repeated his confession, which was later held admissible by the court because it was given freely
20
and after the drug had ceased to be effective.
Much controversy has been voiced as to whether
or not the effect of the scopolamine had actually
worn off at the time the confession was repeated.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we find that there is a use for
narcoanalysis tests in the investigative process,
although its importance has been overrated too
often. Because of its lack of conclusiveness and
absolute accuracy, "truth serums" should be used
only as a last resort, by psychiatrists who have had
experience with the drugs. We are not in the days
of Dr. House anymore, when it was a rule to "beat
the truth out of a suspect."
We have advanced in many aspects, and today
more than ever we are anxious to respect human
and constitutional rights of the individual. Therefore, no coercion of any kind should be used during
interrogation in an effort to obtain a confession,
not even Dr. House's "humane third degree."
20People v. Townsend, 11 Ill. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729
(1957). One judge dissenting.

